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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

LANDON v. ZORN: INQUIRY ABOUT POTENTIAL BIAS
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS IN MALPRACTICE CASES IS NOT
SUFFICIENTL Y CONNECTED WITH THE ISSUE OF TORT
REFORM TO GENERATE A REQUIRED VOIR DIRE
QUESTION

By: Melyssa Morey
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a question regarding
potential bias against plaintiffs in malpractice cases is too general in
nature to constitute a required voir dire question. Landon v. Zorn, 389
Md. 206, 223, 884 A.2d 142, 152 (2005). In Maryland, the scope of
voir dire is limited and must be designed to elicit responses about the
biases of the jurors.
On the morning of January 8, 2001, Richard Landon ("Landon")
went to the emergency room at Atlantic General Hospital complaining
of leg pain and flu-like symptoms. Dr. Pamela Zorn ("Dr. Zorn")
evaluated Landon, and initially diagnosed him as suffering from a flulike syndrome, and indicated that a flare up from an old leg injury was
causing the leg pain. However, Dr. Zorn was not completely satisfied
with the diagnosis, and asked Landon to undergo a CAT scan. He
refused, stating he wanted to go home and sleep, and was discharged
at 12: 15 p.m. with a prescription for a muscle relaxant and instructions
to return to the hospital if his condition worsened.
At 4:45 p.m. the next afternoon, Landon's wife called Dr. Zorn
with a question, at which time Dr. Zorn reiterated that she would like
to perform a CAT scan. Mrs. Landon said she would try to persuade
her husband to have one. Approximately seven hours later, Dr. Zorn
learned that Landon had not returned for the test and called Mrs.
Landon, instructing her to bring her husband back to the hospital even
if she had to call 911. Landon returned to the hospital just before
midnight, and was transferred to Maryland's Shock Trauma Center.
He was diagnosed with a group A beta hemolytic streptococcal
infection and underwent multiple surgeries, including the amputation
of his leg at the hip.
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The Landons sued Dr. Zorn in the Circuit Court for Worcester
County, claiming medical negligence. A jury found in favor of Dr.
Zorn, determining that she did not breach the standard of care in her
treatment of Landon. The Landons appealed and the Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted certiorari prior to the Court of Special Appeals'
consideration of the matter.
The Landons presented two questions on appeal: "[ d]id the circuit
court err by failing to voir dire the prospective jurors on the issue of
tort reform?" and "[ d]id the circuit court err by failing to give a
requested jury instruction and the Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction on
informed consent?" Id. at 211,884 A.2d at 144-45.
The Court initially stated that the first question presented by the
Landons on appeal was not reflective of their proposed voir dire
question, which was not connected to the issue of tort reform. Id. at
217, 8&4 A.2d at 148. The voir dire question that the Landons wanted
asked read:
Does any member of the jury panel have any
preconceived opinion or bias or prejudice in favor of, or
against plaintiffs in personal injury cases in general and
medical malpractice cases in particular? If yes, please
explain. Would this prevent you from fairly and
impartially trying the facts and circumstances presented
in this matter?
Id. at 214, 884 A.2d at 146. The Court noted that voir dire is limited
in scope in Maryland, and courts have the discretion to ask or not ask
proposed voir dire questions. Id. at 216, 884 A.2d at 148. Unless a
voir dire question is properly formed to determine a potential cause for
disqualification, it can be excluded absent any prejudice to the
plaintiffs. Id. at 218, 884 A.2d at 149 (citing Kujawa v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96 (1961)). The Landons argued
that their question was "designed to uncover potential prejudice
against them and in favor of doctors in medical malpractice cases." Id.
at 217,884 A.2d at 148.
The Court went on to state that just because a person holds a
particular belief does not mean it will affect his ability to consider
evidence fairly and impartially in reaching a conclusion. Id. at 215,
884 A.2d at 146 fn.3. If jurors were excluded for their beliefs, the
public policy of having a jury that represents a cross section of the
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community would be nullified. Id. Jurors cannot be automatically
excluded from the jury pool simply based on their beliefs about a law
or policy, so long as they feel they can reach a fair and impartial
conclusion based on the law. Id. at 219,884 A.2d at 149.
The Landons also asked the Court to apply the principles of
Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979) to "voir dire questions
involving medical malpractice and tort reform." Landon, 389 Md. at
220, 884 A.2d at 150. Borkoski sued a hospital and two doctors
following the death of his wife. Id. The insurance company that
provided malpractice insurance to the doctors had been involved in an
advertising campaign that targeted jurors and claimed that "[l]arge
jury awards would result in everyone paying higher insurance
premiums." Id. (quoting Borkoski, 594 P.2d at 689-90). Borkoski
proposed a voir dire question, which the trial court declined to ask,
inquiring whether potential jurors had been exposed to these
advertisements. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana
affirmed the trial court's ruling, but noted that "upon a proper showing
of possible prejudice" it may be appropriate to give a voir dire
question that asked whether jurors had heard or read anything
indicating that plaintiff s verdicts in personal injury cases resulted in
higher insurance premiums for everyone, if they believed it, and if
they thought it would interfere with their ability to render a fair
verdict. Id. at 220-221, 884 A.2d at 150. (quoting Borkoski, 594 P.2d
at 694). The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to adopt the
principles of Borkoski stating that, unlike in Montana, voir dire in
Maryland is limited in scope and that the Landons' case did not
warrant expansion of the scope. Id. at 222-23,884 A.2d at 151-52.
Regarding jury instructions, the Landons challenged the trial
court's refusal to give two instructions, one regarding contributory
negligence and the other informed consent. Id. at 224, 884 A.2d at
152. According to Maryland Rule 2-520(c), the court does not need to
give a requested jury instruction if the matter is covered by other
instructions actually given. Id. at 224, 884 A.2d at 153. Instead of
giving the Landons' requested jury instruction, the trial court gave an
instruction based on the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions on
contributory negligence. Id. at 225,884 A.2d at 153.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision because the
Landons could not show that they had been prejudiced by the failure to
give their requested jury instruction. Id. at 227, 884 A.2d at 154. The
jury did not reach the question of contributory negligence, as the
verdict sheet instructed them not to answer any further questions if
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they answered "No" to the first question concerning the breach of
standard of care. Id. at 228,884 A.2d at 154, 155.
As to the trial court's failure to give an instruction on infonned
consent, the Court ruled that in Maryland a cause of action for lack of
consent can only be based on failure to get consent before perfonning
an affinnative act on a patient. Id. at 229, 884 A.2d at 155. Dr. Zorn
did not undertake an affinnative act, but merely recommended a
diagnostic test. Id. at 230, 884 A.2d at 156. Even if this could be
considered an affinnative act, the Landons did not establish that the
standard of care required Dr. Zorn to infonn Landon of the risks of not
having the test, thus they were not entitled to the infonned consent
instruction. Id.
While the Court stated the Landons' proposed voir dire question
was too general and had no clear connection to the issue of tort refonn,
it did not address how specific a question must be for there to be a
connection. The Court also did not delve into what facts in a case may
warrant an expansion of the scope of voir dire in Maryland, along the
lines of Borkoski. Finally, the Court's repeated admonition that a
person may be able to fairly render a verdict despite a particular bias
they have about tort refonn seems to ignore basic human nature. A
person who believes that medical malpractice lawsuits are driving up
the cost of insurance and healthcare across America is not very likely
to find for the plaintiff just because the current law allows them to do
so.

